World

Can Canada really leave in 2011?

Brian Stewart on Canada's 'post-departure' Afghan commitment.

If you want a sense of what Canada is planning to do in Afghanistan after 2011, when our combat role officially ends, don't ask the military.

Really, I've tried. Often. And it's not because lips are sealed. Even Canada's top officers simply don't have a clue.

Ask and you get a sincere shrug along with the response that security for the Winter Olympics in Vancouver in six months is much more on their minds right now.

Stephen Harper and Chief of Defence Staff Walter Natynczyk tour the Dahla Dam project, which Canada is refurbishing, in Kandahar province in May 2009. (Chris Wattie? Reuters)

As things stand, you would have to say that contingency planning for deployment in Afghanistan beyond 2011 is minimal and, at best, simple guesswork.

What is a 'non-combat role'?

The main reason for this is because the Canadian government has still given no clear direction to the military of what to expect or prepare for post-pullout. 

And that is the case even though it is widely expected in military and diplomatic circles that hundreds — and perhaps as many as 1,000 Canadian military personnel — will stay in what's vaguely termed "non-combat" roles.

Don't be misled by that comforting moniker. Many of our forces will remain on the ground in dangerous areas, likely still in the volatile South.

Most will be simply called military "trainers," dedicated to churning out new members of Afghanistan's growing army.

But while the term training summons up images of parades and target practice within a secure base, the reality will be very different.

Those Canadian sergeants and officers who will be helping build these new Afghan units would have no credibility if they simply stayed behind in secure areas.

So instead they will act more as "military advisers," which means going out with these untested units on actual operations against the Taliban.

Which means they'll inevitably face roadside bombings, firefights and casualties.

Political risk

Even the most optimistic scenarios concede it will be several years before fresh Afghan battalions can operate truly independently of foreign advisers who are needed to help with the highly technical aspects of counter-insurgency warfare.

At the moment, neither the Conservatives nor the Liberals in Ottawa want to talk about post-2011. And they will likely wish to keep any debate about future risks at a minimum until after the next election.

Both parties see only a political downside in talking about Afghanistan right now, which is why the military is in the increasingly frustrating position of being kept in the dark about future requirements.

This denial of reality, which is taking place throughout the NATO countries, is why the Afghanistan conflict remains what I've called "a bits and pieces war," starved of military resources and serious commitment from most of the participants.

Virtually every senior Canadian officer I've raised this with just shakes his head in frustration over the lost opportunities and years of wasted effort.

The upshot: Canada is part of a giant military muddle and there is no quick way out. But someone needs to look ahead.

A delicate withdrawal

The current schedule calls for the main Canadian battle force of nearly 3,000 to begin withdrawing two years from now, in the summer of 2011.

Moving out thousands of pieces of equipment and handing over the Kandahar responsibility is no simple matter and will likely last to the very end of that year.

And don't expect the Taliban to allow Canadians a quiet departure.

They will want to portray this is another NATO retreat, which will certainly add to the back-channel pleading from Washington and NATO for Canada to reconsider its 2011 departure.

The Dutch, scheduled to leave next year, are already coming under such pressure.

But Canada could have a much harder time resisting, given our close economic and other ties to the U.S.

Best guess numbers

What this probably means — as best Canadian officers can guess (emphasize guess) — is that Canada will be expected to maintain a ground contingent in Afghanistan of some 200 soldiers as well as 40 police advisers to help train Afghan forces.

Add to this the Canada Province Reconstruction team of 250 soldiers (mostly engineers and the like) and its security cover of another 150.

Throw in another 200 or so to maintain and fly some of the dozen Chinook and Griffon helicopters that Canada will undoubtedly be asked to leave behind for the mission.

Then, if you factor in another 250 to help maintain air transport, the Kandahar base hospital and certain technical and intelligence operations (people who are grafted to other international units), you quickly get close to 1,000.

This would still be a very sizable operation by the standards of Canada's small military. And most of these people would still be based in the volatile Kandahar region.

Twisting arms

Whether Canada can even hold the line at this ceiling may well depend on decisions likely to be taken soon in Washington and Brussels.

If Obama's plan carries, to almost double the current targets for the Afghan army to 250,000, there will be a much greater need for more allied trainers to be posted alongside.

This plan would also bring with it a greater need for additional allied mentors in such key areas as artillery training, engineering, logistics and medical services.

As usual, the most pressure is likely to fall on those with the highest reputations in the mentoring field and who are most capable of delivering results fast. That puts Canada, with its stellar Afghanistan reputation, directly in the Pentagon's crosshairs.

The irony is that Canada does not have enough military trainers for its own army at the moment, and certainly not enough top sergeants and middle level officers to easily share around.

But that excuse is not likely to cut much ice with Washington, which is sure to bring as much pressure as it can bear on Ottawa over the next year. 

The Americans, and also our British allies, are not likely to take the prime minister's view "We've done enough" as a sufficient national mission statement in a time of war.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Brian Stewart

Canada and abroad

Brian Stewart is one of this country's most experienced journalists and foreign correspondents. He sits on the advisory board of Human Rights Watch Canada. He was also a Distinguished Senior Fellow at the Munk School for Global Affairs at the University of Toronto. In almost four decades of reporting, he has covered many of the world's conflicts and reported from 10 war zones, from El Salvador to Beirut and Afghanistan.