Residents want accountability from the LRT inquiry, but who will face the music?

Who's to blame?

That is what so many of us want to know when it comes to the troubled $2.1-billion Confederation Line. 

Sure, we are interested in the details of how we ended up with an LRT that suffered from faulty doors and brakes, flat wheels, cracked wheels, and a broken-off wheel, kinked rails and collapsed cables, glitchy switches and stinky stations, multiple shutdowns and two derailments that — along with city council's refusal to call its own inquiry — ultimately led Ontario Transportation Minister Caroline Mulroney to order up a provincial one. 

We do want to know more about the contractual specifics, unusual debt financing, and technical troubles that all contributed to the problems,  or whether the private-public partnership (P3) model, which was used for the first time ever for an Ontario transit project, led to cutting corners and rushing an unreliable system to service.

And we are certainly keen to learn the commission's view of the involvement of LRT super-consultant Brian Guest, whose private email indicated a public inquiry could "screw" him, and who's been instrumental in copying Ottawa's P3 model in transit projects in the Toronto area long before it was proven to work — or not work, as the case may be. 

But when the final report into Ottawa's LRT inquiry lands Wednesday morning, we want inquiry commissioner Justice William Hourigan to hone in on who should answer for this mess.

In truth, there's plenty of blame to go around. 

The system builder Rideau Transit Group (RTG) — the consortium made up of SNC-Lavalin, Ellis Don and ACS Infrastructure — has been taking it on the chin in public for years, as has France-based train maker Alstom.

There is merit to the criticism, though, as these are all multinational corporations that have worked on billion-dollar transportation projects the world over. Ultimately, they should be counted on to deliver the system they said they could build, on time, for the price they promised — all spelled out in the contract.

But that doesn't often happen. Or possibly ever, as even internationally savvy executives apparently continually succumb to "optimism bias", as the inquiry heard.

So perhaps the more pertinent issue is who let this happen. 

City believes commission will be critical

As the city manager's sudden resignation on Monday so clearly telegraphs, city officials believe the report will point the finger at city hall. 

None of the parties involved in the inquiry gets an advance copy of the report, but in his farewell note to city staff, Kanellakos wrote that "based on the line of questioning and approach taken by the commission, that the report will be critical of the city of Ottawa and city staff."

He is probably right. 

From the very first day of the public hearings, commission lawyers grilled city officials about whether political pressure, particularly from then-mayor Jim Watson, kept the budget too tight and the timeline too short. 

Over four weeks of public testimony from more than 40 witnesses, we learned it was the city that wanted Alstom trains — light rail vehicles that, according to one of the company's executives, did not yet exist and that were "pushing the limits" of what a light rail vehicle can do.

On one particularly damning day for the city, rail manager Richard Holder testified the city willingly accepted a light rail system it knew was likely unreliable, and changed criteria to make it easier for RTG to pass the final testing of the Confederation Line.

From Holder, we also learned the city agreed in July 2019 to accept that the LRT was basically finished — and paid RTG $59 million — even though there was a long list of outstanding problems, including with each of the 34 light rail vehicles.

Another outstanding problem the city allowed to pass? A system-wide "failure to meet fleet requirements due to ongoing defects/deficiencies."

We found out the contract was changed to accept a rail system with just 13 double-car trains on the track instead of 15, which was not reported to city council. We also heard that Ottawa's own head of transportation John Manconi — who likely suggested that the trial running criteria be changed to make it easier — urged the city's representative on the trial team to use "discretion" to pass the Confederation Line on a day it should have failed.

• Analysis: How the bar for LRT trial running was lowered — then lowered some more

We watched commission co-lead counsel John Adair accuse the then-mayor of lying under oath. Watson had previously testified that he didn't get daily updates on the trial testing when WhatsApp messages — ordered by the commission from the city midway through the public hearings — showed Watson was indeed being briefed. 

The information, or lack thereof, shared with city council members on the Confederation Line just before the city took control became a central theme of the inquiry.

In fact, during Kanellakos' four hours of testimony in the final week of the hearings, he was grilled about, among other things, why council wasn't told about changing the criteria midway through the trial running of the LRT. He was also pushed on why he stopped a memo Manconi had written to councillors telling them the testing had been put on hold for a couple of days. 

Perhaps most damaging was the evidence surrounding the role of the independent certifier. Kanellakos had said repeatedly, including during his testimony, that the city could feel confident in the fact the Confederation Line had been signed off by the independent certifier.

What we learned, though, was that the independent certifier is an official box-checker — making sure that documentation is completed — and mediator. The independent certifier, Altus Group's Monica Sechiari, was not consulted on the changes to the contract to deem the LRT substantially complete, nor did she have any input into the trial testing criteria.

In fact, she was not even in the city during the key 12-day testing period, leaving a very junior colleague in her place.

Given the evidence, it perhaps becomes less surprising that Kanellakos didn't want to be the one left holding the bag for the city on this giant, complex mess. After all, the LRT wasn't his baby — it was a project he inherited in 2016 when he became city manager.

Of the city's senior leadership team that oversaw the procurement and construction and launch of the LRT, not one will be present to answer to the final report on Wednesday. Former city manager Kent Kirkpatrick, his deputy Nancy Schepers, now-former mayor Jim Watson, and transit boss John Manconi have all packed up and left city hall.

We may find out Wednesday who should shoulder the blame, but it will be somewhat difficult to find anyone willing to carry that burden.