5 things we learned from the final report on foreign interference
Disinformation, misinformation in media and on social networks are 'single biggest risk' to Canadian democracy
Justice Marie-Josée Hogue, commissioner of the public inquiry into foreign interference, issued her final report on Tuesday after conducting a 16-month investigation into how foreign actors have tried to interfere in democratic institutions and the electoral process in the 2019 and 2021 federal elections.
In her seven-volume report, Hogue detailed the evidence she gathered from hearing more than 150 witnesses since the Inquiry began in September 2023.
Those findings reveal what she thinks are the greatest threat to Canadian democracy, how federal party leadership contests should be reformed and the challenges associated with interpreting intelligence.
She also details why party leaders need to get security briefings and how cumbersome information sharing within government complicated efforts to respond to foreign interference attempts.
The 'single biggest risk' to Canadian democracy
Hogue wrote that while foreign states targeting parliamentarians has garnered much attention, the greater threat to Canadian democracy is the spread of misinformation and disinformation in the media and on social networks.
She wrote disinformation "is noxious, and it is powerful. It poses a major risk to Canadian democracy. If we do not find ways of addressing it, misinformation and disinformation have the ability to distort our discourse, change our views and shape our society.
"In my view it is no exaggeration to say that at this juncture, information manipulation (whether foreign or not) poses the single biggest risk to our democracy," she wrote. "It is an existential threat."
In her report, Hogue wrote that the act of "transnational repression," when a foreign state monitors, intimidates and harasses immigrant communities in Canada to achieve its own national objectives, has become a "genuine scourge" to the democratic process in Canada.
While her mandate did not task her with examining the full depth and extend of transnational repression, she said she learned enough during the public hearings to "sound the alarm that the government must take this seriously and consider ways to address it."
"It would be challenging to overstate its seriousness, or the impact it has on individuals and our social fabric," she wrote, adding that the targeting of immigrant communities by foreign states is "one of the greatest strategic challenges to Canada's sovereignty and democracy.
She said the federal government is making efforts in this area.
The problem with the NSICOP report
In June, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, NSICOP, released a report that said some elected officials in Canada were "semi-wittingly" or "wittingly" helping foreign governments interfere in Canada's democratic process.
After the report was published, there were widespread calls for MPs who had read the report to identify the names of officials suspected for working to advance the interests of foreign governments.
Hogue reviewed the NSICOP report and said that while it "does not name individual parliamentarians" it does make "strongly worded and unequivocally stated allegations against individual parliamentarians," based on intelligence documents.
The report warns that while "intelligence can be extremely valuable in informing government and enabling it to develop policy … the frailties of intelligence make it dangerous to rely on" unquestioned.
"This is particularly true for intelligence that may suggest misconduct by individuals, such as the involvement of individual parliamentarians in foreign interference activities," the report said.
Hogue wrote the NSICOP report cast a "cloud of suspicion over all parliamentarians" and as a result contributed to "the erosion of Canadians' trust in their democratic institutions."
"The situation is not as clear cut, nor as extreme, as the fears provoked by the NSICOP report," Hogue wrote.
Shortcomings with information sharing
Hogue wrote that while there were no "particular issues with the way in which information flowed" to senior decision-makers in the run up to, and in the weeks after, the 2019 and 2021 federal elections, there were still "shortcomings."
"Information that should have reached the ministers and even the prime minister did not," Hogue said, adding that she could not determine why this happened.
"The evidence did show, however, that the systems in place at the time were not particularly robust," she added. "There was no way of knowing who had received a particular report, whether those who had received it had read it and whether any actions had been taken as a result."
Hogue wrote that in some cases she was left with the impression that people involved in sharing information about possible instances of foreign interference felt "they had fulfilled their duties as soon as they had delivered the information, without otherwise making sure that it had been received and understood."
The commissioner wrote that she had no indication that "anyone acted in bad faith." Hogue wrote that the issues were systemic in nature and were made worse by the COVID-19 pandemic.
Hogue also wrote that while "the intelligence delivery system has been completely redesigned," since the 2019 and 2021 federal elections, she has not "been able to put this new system to the test to see how effective and resilient it is, but the evidence suggests that it is much more suitable than the previous one."
Party leaders and security clearance
Among her list of recommendations to combat foreign interference, Hogue says in her report that "leaders of all political parties represented in the House of Commons should be encouraged and given the opportunity to obtain top-secret security clearances as soon as possible after they become leaders."
Hogue said in her final report that while the leaders of the Liberals, NDP, Bloc Québécois and the Green Party now have top-secret clearance, Conservative Leader Pierre Poilievre declined to get his, although his chief of staff has obtained clearance.
She said that while Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has directed the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, CSIS, and other officials to try to inform Poilievre of possible threats to his party and its members, keeping the Conservative leader properly informed "may be challenging" unless he gets top-secret clearance.
"The prime minister testified that chiefs of staff have more limited authorities compared to party leaders and are not accountable to the public in the same way," the report said.
Poilievre maintains that receiving the security clearance would leave him unable to speak openly or challenge the Liberal government.
"Unlike others who are willing to limit their ability to hold the government accountable on important issues of national security, Mr. Poilievre will not be gagged and unable to speak or act on information he may receive," a Poilievre spokesman said Tuesday.
Reforming party leadership races
Hogue provided a list of 51 recommendations for how the government can address concerns of foreign interference, some of which require legislative changes and others which could be implemented before the next federal election.
Among her recommendations that she urges action on immediately, are reforms to the way party leaders are chosen in Canada, including:
- Making sure people casting votes in a leadership election or nomination races are Canadian citizens and permanent residents.
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Requiring political parties to obtain a declaration from their members regarding their status as Canadian citizens or permanent residents.
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Applying the Canada Elections Act to leadership races at all times, not just during elections.
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Requiring parties and electoral districts to file their rules for nominations and leadership contests with Elections Canada.
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Requiring all nomination and leadership contestants to file a financial return with Elections Canada.
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