From missing ammo to friendly fire: retired major-general recalls dire challenges of Afghan mission
'Our job was not to lose,' retired major-general said of Canadian-led offensive
As the Canadian military prepares itself to embark on a new peacekeeping mission in Mali, a retired major-general is looking back to Afghanistan in 2006, when he was involved in what could be the country's defining battle of the modern era.
David Fraser commanded over 2,000 NATO coalition troops as they faced off against the Taliban in the southern Afghan province of Kandahar.
The battle stretched from Sept. 1 to 17. It was the largest battle fought by Canadian troops since the Korean War.
Fraser, now retired, is the co-author of a new book about the crucial mission, titled Operation Medusa: The furious battle that saved Afghanistan from the Taliban.
Cold War-era tactics
"The actual goal of Operation Medusa was not to lose," he told The Current's Anna Maria Tremonti. "There is no such thing as a military solution in operations today. The only solution that there is, is called a political settlement. So our job was not to lose. Our job was to buy time."
Such an objective might sound straightforward, but Medusa proved to be the most complicated operation Fraser had encountered thus far.
NATO's forces found themselves in a conventional Cold War-style battle facing off against the Taliban who were hunkered down in a stronghold on the opposite side of the Arghandab River.
"This was not what we went to Afghanistan to do. We went to build a nation and fight a counter-insurgency, not to do a Cold War attack," said Fraser.
Charles Company
The Charles Company of the Royal Canadian Regiment suffered particularly bad losses during Operation Medusa, from two separate incidents. Initially, they were doing well on the south side of the Arghandab River, against the Taliban who were on the north side. But eventually, their fortunes changed.
When the door knocks at 20 to 6 [a.m.], you know you didn't win the lottery.- David Fraser, retired major-general
"Tragically, four soldiers were killed when the Taliban came across a casualty-collecting point. They killed two NCOs (non-commissioned officers) and two soldiers," said Fraser.
Things became worse on Sept. 4, when a U.S. warplane mistakenly strafed Charles Company as they were preparing to make a renewed push. One soldier was killed and 34 were wounded.
Fraser recalled how he heard the news. His chief of staff knocked on his cabin door early in the morning.
"When the door knocks at 20 to 6 [a.m.], you know you didn't win the lottery. It was just really bad news. He said, 'One killed, 34 wounded.' And I was stunned."
Charles Company was decimated. The survivors were too shaken for the unit to be considered combat effective.
For all the tragic loss of life, Fraser is thankful for the people who helped prevent it from getting even worse.
"There was one female medic who was an absolute hero that day, for providing first aid and saving all those wounded from even further damage or death," he recalled.
Missing ammunition
Fraser describes several breakdowns in what likely should have been basic military logistics in his book. During the battle, the Canadian troops discovered they were dangerously close to running out of 22mm bullets in the middle of the fight.
The ammunition reports weren't being filed properly and they were running off of incorrect data.
"There is no Walmart. There's no Canadian Tire. You don't just go down the road when you need something and go buy it. You got to go back to Canada to get it," he said.
In the end, they got the supplies they needed — though they got it from an unexpected source.
"I just can't say enough about the support we got back out of Ottawa," said Fraser.
"They found the ammunition — but it was in New Zealand."
'I need a tank'
By September 2006, the Taliban took to hunkering down in urban environments like cities that were very close to buildings that were also occupied by civilians. Coalition forces were unable to conduct airstrikes, as the risk to civilians became too high.
Fraser's solution to the problem was as old-fashioned as it gets: tanks.
"I needed precision that had a small enough effect that would deal with the bad guys I wanted without destroying the livelihood of the Afghans. We would have disenfranchised and lost their support. So the only thing in our inventory that could do that was a tank," he said.
- 'Failure strategy': How NATO won the battle but lost Afghanistan
- Tragedy of Operation Medusa is Taliban may soon win back ground
The only problem? Most of Canada's Leopard tanks were being decommissioned.
"[I was] talking to my staff and they're saying, 'You know, Ottawa's going to think you're nuts,' because they're mothballing these things.
"I said, I don't care if they're mothballed or not. I need a tank."
Fraser sent a request to then general Rick Hillier for tanks, who responded by sending him more units than he originally asked for. Some had to be ripped from recently-installed monuments and revitalized into working condition.
"Just the fact that we did that — sent a message through the entire coalition that Canada — we weren't screwing around here. We're dead serious," said Fraser.
Looking ahead to Mali
Still, Fraser commends the effectiveness of the command teams, soldiers and logistical support from Ottawa for many of the successes they achieved during Operation Medusa.
He strongly believes the lessons learned can and should be taken into the next peacekeeping mission in Mali.
"What we brought to this conflict was a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, a 'Whole of Government,' Team Canada approach," he said.
"We probably could look at the lessons [from] Operation Medusa and what we learned out of our 12,14 years in Afghanistan and we could actually apply that to every other mission as we go around the world, including Mali."
This segment was produced by The Current's Geoff Turner.