Unanswered questions about Canada and ISIS
Are we at war or not? The vote, which takes us into the U.S.-led coalition against the marauders of Islamic State, split the House of Commons along party lines: 157 to 134. The vote not only highlighted the divisions within our politics, it raised many more questions than have thus far been answered. For example, if the threat of Islamic...
Are we at war or not? The vote, which takes us into the U.S.-led coalition against the marauders of Islamic State, split the House of Commons along party lines: 157 to 134. The vote not only highlighted the divisions within our politics, it raised many more questions than have thus far been answered. For example, if the threat of Islamic State is as dire as the government suggests, why is our contribution to the coalition so piddling?
As historian Andrew Cohen wrote ten days ago, "Given its rhetoric, you'd think we were assembling the greatest expeditionary force since Normandy. To the great battle of civilization, we offer a pea shooter that we fire safely and clinically from above."
We are sending a grand total of six fighter jets and some six hundred support personnel: clerks, mechanics, administrators and so on. Is this truly pulling our weight, given the planned contributions of the other coalition nations?
Was Canada requested by the White House to get onside with the intervention or did Canada volunteer? What went into the determination to limit our involvement to six months? Is there a possibility that the mission might be extended after six months? And precisely what is the mission? Is it to stop the advance of Islamic State or destroy it or save Kurdistan or rebuild Iraq?
The mission to Afghanistan, which began in 2001, was fairly clear: to seek out and kill enough Taliban fighters to the point they were no longer a threat to the government or the people of the country; and to try to reconstruct some semblance of a civil society. The mission lasted 12 years, our longest-ever war, cost the treasury $12 billion and took the lives of 158 of our fighting men and women. Another 1,500 or so came home with terrible war wounds. The next few years will tell whether the Afghanistan mission was a success; but from all reports, there is still rampant violence, high levels of political corruption and a flourishing drug trade in the country.
To be fair, there are questions which should be directed at the two Opposition parties as well.
Do those party leaders have any worthwhile alternatives other than humanitarian aid? Blankets, powdered milk and pup tents are not going to impede the march southward by the Islamic State fanatics.
Would they simply leave the fight to locals in the area? Are there not times when Canada has to join in military missions to stop or at least impede terror? How effective will high-level bombing be? Is there a chance that we will be asked to contribute combat troops? And if so what will our answer be?
Bill Clinton's defense secretary William Cohen wrote in a recent op-ed: "Attempting to resolve ancient religious differences and grievances at the end of a bomb or bullet is a fool's errand."
It is a curious thing that though our media have been shocked at the beheadings of three Westerners, Saudi Arabia, one of our coalition partners, beheads people on a semi-regular basis.
Finally, what is Canada's national interest in this fight? Is there, in fact, a national interest in this fight? Author and political science professor James Laxer wrote this week: "Canada should not become embroiled in a war unless the mission passes the test that it is in the national interest. The mission against ISIS fails that test."
Everybody's fear is of quagmire, that - no matter what the coalition does - at the end of the mission, Islamic State will still be there, as terrifying as ever. As the disillusioned British spy says in LeCarre's The Secret Pilgrim: "The more fanatics you kill, the more there are."